

FIELD MARSHAL SHFJ MANEKSHAW'S ROLE IN FIRST INDO-PAK WAR 1947-1948

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ABSTRACT

Field Marshal Sam Hormusji Framji Jamshedji Manekshaw is popularly known as “Sam Manekshaw”, “Sam Bahadur” and the legendary Indian Military leader who took part in several tough duties in Indian Army from October 1932 to January 1973. During Instrument of Accession between India and the princely State of J&K, he served as Lieutenant Colonel, performed deputy Directory Military Operation at General headquarters in Delhi and went to princely state of Jammu & Kashmir along with VP Menon, Secretary of Ministry of State. During his first visit of princely State of Jammu & Kashmir, he showed his extraordinary calibre, analyzed the Ariel military

situation of J&K and confidently briefed the real military situation in front of the Governor General, Lord Louis Mountbatten and other political head of India. Throughout, the first Indo-J&K operation, he travelled several times to J&K to find out the latest situation. According to the situation, he prepared the masterly operation strategy for defeating Pakistan. For 1947 J&K criticalness, he lost his chance for commanding an infantry battalion and enthusiastically served for nation's welfare. In this research paper, an attempt has been made to highlight the historical role and played by Sam Manekshaw for our country during the first Indo-Pak War 1947-48.

Key Words:- Field Marshal, Infantry, Princely States, Operation Gulmarg, Military Security Council, Instrument of Accession, Cease Fire Line,

INTRODUCTION

Field Marshal Sam Hormusji Framji Jamshedji Manekshaw is popular around the world and known as “Sam Manekshaw”, “Sam Bahadur”, etc. Sam Manekshaw, the son of Parsi parents was born on 03 April, 1914. He started his military career at the age of eighteen under British India, and join Indian Military Academy (IMA), Dehradun on 01 October, 1932. After a very hard military training from October 1932 to December 1934, Sam Manekshaw was commissioned as Indian Commissioned Officer (ICO) in Indian Army under British rule. After commissioning as a Second Lieutenant, he was attached to the Royal Scots at Lahore, then finally he was posted to 4th Battalion of 12th Frontier Force Regiment (4/12 FFR) also known as the 54th Sikh. From October 1932 to January 1973 he took part in several tough duties of Indian Army. He showed his extraordinary calibre in World War-II, 1947

first Indo-Pak War, 1962 Indo-China conflict and 1971 Indo-Pak War. He also held many higher positions in the Indian Army during his tremendous military career and reached the highest rank of Indian Army Field Marshal on 01 January, 1973. He was the first one, who got this rank for his dedicated and loyal achievements. He was awarded the Military Cross (MC) during World War-II. Also he was honoured Padma Bhushan in 1968, Padma Vibhushan in 1972 for his distinguished service of the Indian nation.

In this research paper an attempt has been made to highlight the role contributed by Colonel SHFJ Manekshaw (later Field Marshal) in first Indo-Pak War 1947-1948. In this war, the well-known patriotic hero SHFJ Manekshaw took crucial role of analyzing the ariel military situation of Jammu and Kashmir, and preparing the masterly operational strategy for defeating Pakistan.

SHFJ MANEKSHAW'S PANEL TRANSFERRED TO 3/5 GR

In 1946, under the British India, Lieutenant Colonel Sam Manekshaw was in 4th Battalion of 12th Frontier Force Regiment (4/12 FFR) and he was posted to General Headquarters in New Delhi, as General Staff Officer, Grade-1 (GSO-1), Military Operations-3 (MO-3). He was the first Indian officer posted to the Military Operations Directorate. At the same time in the process of Indianisation other officers Yahya Khan, who later became President of Pakistan and SK Sinha later Lieutenant General, and Governor of Jammu and Kashmir (J &K) in India were also his colleagues as a Major. In 1947, when India got Independence, the division of assets and regiments between India and Pakistan Army crystallized. Manekshaw's parent unit 4/12 FFR would remain with Pakistan. Manekshaw had been born and brought up in Punjab, but his wife and the rest of the family was from Bombay. Hence he had been asked for his choice. Though Jinnah had asked him to choose for Pakistan, he preferred to remain in India. Then his panel was transferred to the 3rd Battalion of the 5th Gorkha Rifles (3/5 GR), as first Indian Commanding Officer (CO) of the Gorkha Battalion. The news received by the Gorkha Battalion in Bombay and geared up to welcome there new CO.

PRINCELY STATE JAMMU AND KASHMIR

The British had acquired the Kashmir region following the First Sikh War, but lacked the resources to manage it. As an alternative, they sold it under the treaty of Amritsar to Gulab Singh, the Raja of Jammu for rupees 7,50,000/. Thereby the princely state Jammu and Kashmir came into being on 16 March, 1846. At the time of Indian Independence, Jammu and Kashmir State was governed by a Hindu Maharaja Hari Singh, the great grandson of Gulab Singh. The state appeared on the map of India as somewhat rectangular projection in the extreme north-west corner of the subcontinent. In the provisions of Latitude and Longitude the state lay between 32°17' and 36°58' North and 73°26' and 80°30' East. But in this vast area of Indian Princely State, there were only 39 towns and 8,903 villages and an area was 2,22,870 square kilometres. Out of total population of about four million in 1947, the urban population was estimated at 3,62,314 and the rural at 35,03,929. Even before the birth of Pakistan, J & K was surrounded on almost three sides by foreign states. To east of the state lay Tibet, to its North lay Chinese Turkestan or Sinkiang (Xinjiang). To the west lay Afghanistan; to the southwest and south was Pakistan; and to the south and south-east lay the states of Punjab and Himachal Pradesh of India. The valley of Kashmir located approximately in the centre of the state, the Jhelum River running into north and south of valley. The valley is about 80 miles long and 30 miles wide. The state's capital Srinagar is northeast of the valley's center. The state, 81,000 square miles is violently mountains. In this Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir has divided into three geographical regions consisting of Jammu region, the Kashmir valley and the Ladakh region. The Jammu and outer hills region have a

Hindu majority, the Kashmir valley had Muslim majority and the high mountain region Ladakh had Buddhist majority population.

STATUS OF J & K AT THE TIME OF INDIAN INDEPENDENCE

The Maharaja of the Jammu and Kashmir Princely States had made his choice (before 15 August, 1947), whether their territories should join India or Pakistan. Territories of the princely states of India fell either in independent Indian sub-continent or independent Pakistan. But, whereas in the case of princely state of Jammu and Kashmir it was not so. The region fell in both the countries of India and Pakistan. Princely State Jammu and Kashmir has majority Muslims population and ruled over by Hindu Maharaja. In this circumstance, Pakistan felt that they had a great claim to the state because most of the Kashmiris are Muslim. As a secular country, India did not give importance to religion and did not like to make it as a political issue. This has had been the reason for the bone of content between India and Pakistan since Independence. But, the Maharaja Hari Singh neither wants to join India nor Pakistan, and he wanted to be Independent. Maharaja's this decision later created big conflict between India and Pakistan and began first Indo-Pak War in 1947.

OPERATION GULMARG IN 1947

The raid 'Operation Gulmarg' was a calculatedly planned operation by Army Headquarters of Pakistan which aimed at the annexation of Jammu & Kashmir. The raid 'Operation Gulmarg' was in two phases. Phase-I commenced in early September 1947 in the form of armed raids along with the entire border of Jammu province. Phase-II commenced with the actual offensive by main column of the raiders on 22 October, 1947.

Barely two months after independence, the main column of the raiders from Pakistan crossed the frontier of the state of J&K from Garhi Halibullah and attacked Muzaffarabad. The actual offensive was started on 22 October, 1947 by Colonel Akbar Khan, then the Director of Weapons and Equipment, Pakistan Army issued 4000 rifles and ammunition to demobilized World War II Muslim soldiers and pensioners in Poonch and Mirpur area to create a rebellion. This border area was occupied by Afridis, Waziris, Mahsuds and Swatis tribes. These tribes dived into group of approximately 1000 strength led by own tribal chief was also to be provided with a Major, a Captain and ten Junior Commissioned Officers (JCO) of regular Pakistan Army. The Major was to be the actual commander of the tribal and act as the 'adviser' of the tribal malik nominally in command of the Unit. The Captain was to act as staff officer, while each ten JCOs were to be in-charge of a company. Actually the order was issued through a Demi-Official (DO) letter marked personal top secret and signed personally by the British C-in-C (General Sir Frank Walter Messery) of the Pakistan Army to Bannu Frontier Brigade Group (BFBG) Brigadier C.P. Murray. When Brigadier C.P. Murray, was away from his office for other responsibilities, the DO letter was received by Major Onkar Singh Kalkat on 20 August, 1947. Since, he was serving as Brigade Major at BFBG headquarters under Brigadier C.P. Murray. He opened and read the letter, but he was quickly called up by the Brigadier and advised not to breathe a word outside about it or else he would never be allowed to leave Pakistan alive. However, he was kept in house arrest in his residence, but this officer escaped and reached Ambala on 18 October, 1947. Then he reached Delhi and met (on 19 October, 1947) Brigadier Kalwant Singh, the acting Chief of General staff (CGS), Colonel Thapar the acting DMO and Sardhar Baldev Singh was the Defence Minister, and told them about the Pakistani invasion plan of 'Operation Gulmarg'.

REQUEST OF MAHARAJA HARI SINGH

The state was facing great danger on the military front. Maharaja's 13,000 troops were deployed at the border near Muzaffarabad. This was mixed troops of Hindu-Dogras and Muslims from Poonch and Mirpur. Maharaja Hari Singh's Royal Army tries to control the Pakistan supported tribesmen (invaders) followed by regular units of the Pakistan Army with an objective of occupying Kashmir. "Maharaja's army could not withstand to attack for more than a few hours. The deputy commissioner was killed while tribal's routed the area. Chinari fell on 23 October and Uri on 24 October, 1947. Also invaders could have reached Srinagar shortly". It was only on 24 October, 1947 that the Government of India got the first news of the invasion of Kashmir. A message received from Pakistan Army headquarters that day informing the supreme commander that, Tribesmen estimated 5000 Afridis, Waziris, Mahsuds and Swatis attacked Muzaffarabad and Domel, and captured both on 22 October, 1947. Tribesmen reported approaching Srinagar, Kohala in danger at being attacked. Tribesmen in large numbers expected to go to Kashmir. On the same day (24th October, 1947) night at 11 p.m an urgent request was sent by Maharaja Hari Singh as head of independent state Jammu and Kashmir specially asking for Indian troops to save Kashmir from the invaders.

ROLE OF MANEKSHAW IN FIRST INDO-PAK WAR

On 25th October, 1947 at 2.30 p.m, Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Sir Roy Bucher* walked into SHFJ Manekshaw's office and ordered him to accompany VP Menon, Secretary, Ministry of States in India to Srinagar. By 4.00 p.m as deputy Director Military Operation (DMO) Lieutenant Colonel Sam Manekshaw accompanied VP Menon, Secretary, Ministry of States in India along with Wing Commander HC Dewan and Colonel KS Katoch were flew into Srinagar by Indian Air Force Dakota for a historic mission.

Lieutenant Colonel Manekshaw was sent to Srinagar for on the spot assessment of the military situation because he was working Directorate of Military Operation. That section was responsible for current operations all over India. The team went to the palace. Maharaja Hari Singh was running from one room to another room and was in confusion. Sam Manekshaw was on the spot, where VP Menon, Mehar Chand Mahajan, Prime Minister of J&K and the Maharaja were discussing the subject with the Instrument of Accession.* Meantime Manekshaw also got the military situation from everybody around him. After the discussion, VP Menon, expecting the raiders arrived any time he advised the Maharaja of J&K to leave Srinagar for Jammu late the night, to escape from being captured by the raiders who could then extract from him whatever they wanted. On the same day night, after the discussion the team returned to Delhi. But Srinagar did not have night flying facilities. Local officials and politicians lit the runway with pine torches; the Dakota with Sam Manekshaw and others were boarded and lifted off for Delhi. The team flew back on the same night early morning (4 a.m) reached Delhi on 26 October, 1947 accompanied by Mehar Chand Mahajan, Prime Minister of Jammu & Kashmir. During his air travel Manekshaw noted some important aerial survey of Jammu and Kashmir.

ASSESSMENT OF J & K SITUATION BY MANEKSHAW

On 26 October, 1947, Lieutenant Colonel SHFJ Manekshaw directly went to General Bucher's residence from airport and explained him to the dangerous situation of the Jammu and Kashmir. His Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Bucher told him to accompany him to a meeting of Defence Committee of the Cabinet held later that morning and present his assessment in front of the board.

The meeting was held at Viceregal Lodge (nowadays Rashtrapati Bhavan) and attended by the Governor General, Lord Louis Mountbatten, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, Sardar

Vallabhbhai Patel, the Deputy Prime Minister, Sardar Baldev Singh, the Defence Minister and several others. There Mountbatten asked Sam Manekshaw to explain the military situation. Manekshaw briefed the committee and pointed out that the Pakistani tribesmen were just 9 Km from Srinagar. It was the end of October (1947), and with the first snowfall access to Kashmir would close till spring. The only link with India was through the Banihal pass across the Pir Panjal ranges. Srinagar airport airfield could close in winter due to snow. Kashmir was hard to find by road or by air till snow melted in April or May. Time was of the core nature. If troops not flown in immediately, the tribesmen would reach into the valley, secure the airport, seal of entry by India and Kashmir would be lost.

REACTION OF INDIAN GOVERNMENT TO MANEKSHAW'S ASSESSMENT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR SITUATION

The committee was waiting for the Indian Prime Minister Nehru's decision. Prime Minister Nehru was thinking about India's relation with Russia, the United States, United Nations and so on in future, so he hesitated to take action against Pakistan. Sardar Patel was in favour of sending troops to Kashmir immediately. During the discussion with Nehru, he lost his patience and asked: "Jawahar, do you want to save Kashmir or not?" "Of course I want Kashmir" replied by Nehru. Patel turned to Sam Manekshaw and the other military officers present and said, "You have your orders. Now go and carry them out".

INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION

After the meeting Shri VP Menon, Secretary, Ministry of States, Government of India and M.C Mahajan, Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir flew to Jammu where the Maharaja Hari Singh signed the formal Instrument of Accession. When Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession unconditionally on 26 October, 1947, the State Jammu and Kashmir became an integral part of the Indian Union. The very next day, on 27 October, 1947, Indian troops were flown into Kashmir. The first Indo-Pak War began.

MANEKSHAW'S PROMOTION IN DMO OFFICE

Indian troops started heavy fight against the invaders and bravely Srinagar was secured. Then, the Indian Army started to recapture Kashmir valley gradually. Meanwhile, due to the best performance of staff official in Delhi Army headquarters 'Lieutenant Colonel SHFJ Manekshaw's earlier issued posting order 3/5 GR was cancelled and Lieutenant Colonel PS Tapa was posted as the commanding officer of that post'. Because, due to the Kashmir issue, General Sir Roy Bucher, the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C), did not allow changing Sam Manekshaw, deputy Director of Military Operations (DMO). After cancellation of Manekshaw's posting order, during the first Indo-Pak War, Sardar Patel, the Home Minister called him several times and sent him to Kashmir to find out the latest situation. In fact, 'he missed the chance of commanding an infantry battalion to get the higher rank Colonel. Whereas in the first Indo-Pak War period, he involve in planning strategies for operating Indian Army against Pakistan, he received two promotions Viz, Colonel and Brigadier in the same office'.

Also here, a Joint Planning Committee (JPC) of Armed Forces was constituted, Colonel Sam Manekshaw, Director of Military Operations, Lieutenant Commander N. Krishnana, the Director of Naval Plans and Intelligence, and Wing Commander P.C. Lal, Director of Policy and Plans. This committee was served by a Joint Planning Staff (JPS) and Intelligence Staff (JIS) consisting of officers each of Major/Squadon Leaders/ Lieutenant Commander level. Here Manekshaw helped to prepare JPC papers and put up to JPC board. The chiefs of staff committee consisting of Admiral Parry, General

K.M. Cariappa and Air Marshal Mukherji used to meet every Wednesday to discuss all matters of inter service interest. These papers helped to plan future operation strategies in the first Indo-Pak War.

BATTLE FIELDS OF FIRST INDO-PAK WAR AND CEASE FIRE ORDER

All ranks of every regiment of the Indian Army participated on the order of battle in the first Indo Pak War. "Major battles were fought at Naushera, Jhangar, Rajaori, Tithwal, Uri, Poonch, Gurais, Skardu, Zojila and Kargil". Meanwhile on 01 January, 1948, Government of India brought to the notice of the UN Security Council that, due to the operations carried on against the Indian State of J&K by the nationals and tribesmen of Pakistan, with assistance and encouragement from the Government of Pakistan. Thereafter, the Security Council had discussion and passed several resolutions. But Pakistan did not stop the support to raiders. Hence, a heavy fighting and continuous military operation carried out in J&K by Indian Government against the nationals and tribesmen of Pakistan. Throughout first Indo Pak-War, Manekshaw had continued his duty in Delhi till the end of the war. He prepared battle strategies for defeating the Pakistan army and tribal raiders. Not only systematized the first Indo-Pak War winning strategy but also prepared military future operational planning strategy.

The war continued for the next 14 months till 31 December, 1948. In the mean time, United Nations made a resolution and recommendation for both countries in the matter of J&K issues. Though India and Pakistan rejected the resolution, and expressed willingness to receive the Security Council Commission. Subsequently, a commission was constituted. The commission appealed to both India and Pakistan on 15 July, 1948 to take measures to improve the situation. Finally, with the intervention of United Nations a cease fire agreed by both countries at 2359 hours before the mid-night of 1-2 January, 1949. 'Manekshaw signed the first signal ordering the cease-fire (Jammu & Kashmir) on 01 January (1949) on behalf of C-in-C of India, Lieutenant General Sir Roy Bucher'.

J & K REMAINED WITH INDIA

Out of 2,22,870 Square Kilometres of Jammu and Kashmir area only 1,38,832 Square kilometres of area under Indian control comprises 96,701 Square kilometres of Ladakh, 15,838 Square kilometres of Valley and 26,293 Square kilometres of Jammu. Pakistan occupied about 35 percent of J&K and the remaining territories of J&K remained with India in 1949.

FIRST INDO –PAK WAR CASUALTIES

During the long campaign, the Indian Army sacrificed 76 officers, 31 JCOs and 996 other Ranks lives for nation and wounded totalled 3152 including 81 officers and 107 JCOs. Apart from these casualties not less than 1990 J&K State force officers and men killed and missing presumed killed. The enemy's casualties estimated 20,000 including 6,000 killed.

UNO AND DRAWING OF CFL

After first Indo-Pak War ceasefire, the United National Council for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) sent a information on 02 July, 1949 and inviting India and Pakistani representatives to meet jointly in Karachi under the sponsorship of the cease-fire's Truce Sub Committee to establish the Cease Fire Line (CFL). The meeting was clarified only for military purpose and no political issues would be considered. The military representatives of India and Pakistan met together in Karachi from 18th to 27th July, 1949 under the Truce Sub Committee of the UNCIP. In this regarding, Indian delegate Brigadier Manekshaw along with Major General KS Thimayya and Lieutenant General S.M Shrinagesh, Mr HM Patel and Mr Vishnu Sahay, Defence Secretaries (Kashmir Affairs) met the Pakistani delegate members under the

four members of the Truce Sub Committee of the UNCIP. After ten days of hard bargaining, the Karachi Agreement finalized the negotiated CFL on 27th Jul, 1949. On the basis of this, agreed CFL would be drawn on a map and then be mutually verified on the ground by the local commanders of the each side with assistance of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP).

CONCLUSION

The Pakistani large scale planned infiltration by the raiders in J & K an early 22 Oct, 1947, may knew some senior British officers who hold higher echelons in Indian Army. But, those chose to keep the Indian government in the dark and not took preventive action. But, Indian Army officers like Lieutenant General K.M. Cariappa, Lieutenant General S.M Shrinagesh and Major General K.S Thimayya played vital role in first Indo-Pak War. With equal spirit, SHFJ Manekshaw played a crucial role in first Indo-Pak War in 1947-49. He analyses the military situation in Jammu and Kashmir during the aerial survey and confidently briefed the real military situation in front of Governor General the British Sovereign, Lord Louis Mountbatten and other political head of India. Throughout the war, he was contributed his service in Delhi headquarters and prepared a masterly strategy for defeating the raiders and also prepared military operational planning strategy for future. Due to first Indo-Pak War, he missed out chance of command a infantry battalion. However, he cheerfully accepted orders and performed well with full of confidence. Subsequently he was promoted to the rank of Colonel and Brigadier in the same office. It's a authentication, to indicate his staff officer responsibility. It is true, Jammu and Kashmir conflict was historically an important experience in Manekshaw's life time achievements. This was the beginning of Manekshaw's career to reached the rank of Field Marshal.

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